Areas of Expertise

Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Political Economy of Finance, Finance and the Media

Academic Degrees

• Phd, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Business School, 2000

Selected Publications

• Goldman, E., Gupta, N., and Israelsen, R. D. (2024). Political Polarization in Financial News. Journal of Financial Economics, 155, 103816 (Editor’s Choice).
• Goldman, E., Martel, J., and  Schneemeier, J. (2022). A Theory of Financial Media. Journal of Financial Economics, 145(1), 239-258.
• Goldman, E., and Wang, W. (2021). Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders. Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 661–699.
• Borisov, A., Goldman, E., and Gupta, N. (2016). The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying. Review of Financial Studies, 29(4), 1039-107. Winner, Best Paper in the Finance Series, 2015 Standard Life Investments Finance Working Paper prize, European Corporate Governance Institute. Covered in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
• Goldman, E., and Huang, P. (2015). Contractual Versus Actual Separation Pay following CEO Turnover. Management Science, 61(5), 1108-1120.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex-ante severance contracts and the ex-post separation pay given to S&P500 CEOs upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a departing CEO receives separation pay in excess of her severance contract. We find that discretionary separation pay is, on average, $8 million, which amounts to close to 242% of a CEO’s annual compensation. We investigate several potential explanations for this phenomenon and find evidence that in voluntary CEO departures, discretionary separation pay represents a governance problem. In contrast, we find evidence that in forced departures, discretionary separation pay is used to facilitate an amicable and smooth transition from the failed ex-CEO to a new CEO. These results help to shed light on the dual role played by severance compensation and on the bargaining game played between the board and the departing executive.

• Goldman, E., and Strobl, G. (2013). Large Shareholder Trading and the Complexity of Corporate Investments. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(1), 106-122.
• Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., and So, J. (2013). Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts. Review of Finance, 13(5), 1617-1648.
• Goldman, E., Peyer, U., and Stefanescu, I. (2012). The Impact of Fraudulent Earnings Manipulation on Industry Rivals. Financial Management Journal, 41(4), 915-945.
• Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., and So, J. (2009). Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360. 

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This paper explores whether political connections are important in the United States. The paper uses an original hand-collected data set on the political connections of board members of S&P 500 companies to sort companies into those connected to the Republican Party and those connected to the Democratic Party.  The analysis shows a positive abnormal stock return following the announcement of the nomination of a politically connected individual to the board. The paper also analyzes the stock price response to the Republican win of the 2000 presidential election and finds that companies connected to the Republican Party increase in value, and companies connected to the Democratic Party decrease in value.

• Goldman, E., and Slezak, S. (2006). An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 603-626.
• Goldman, E., and Jun, Q. (2005). Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 321-346.
• Goldman, E. (2005). Organizational Form, Information Collection, and the Value of the Firm. Journal of Business, 78(3), 817-840.

Edited on August 8, 2025