Areas of Expertise

Industrial Organization, Health Economics, Law and Economics, Applied Econometrics

Academic Degrees

• PhD, Boston University, 2008
• MPhil, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003
• BA, Zhejiang University, 2001

Selected Publications

• Lin, H., and Wildenbeest, M. R. (2020). Non-Parametric Estimation of Search Costs for Differentiated Products: Evidence from Medigap. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 38(4), 754-770.
• Lin, H., and Sacks, D. (2019). Intertemporal Substitution in Health Care Demand: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 175, 29-43.
• Freedman, S., Lin, H., and Prince, J. (2018). Information Technology and Patient Health: Analyzing Outcomes, Populations, and Mechanisms. American Journal of Health Economics, 4(1), 51-79.
• Freedman, S., Lin, H., and Prince, J. (2018). Does Competition Lead to Agglomeration or Dispersion in EMR Vendor Decisions? Review of Industrial Organization, 53(1), 57-79.
• Lin, H., and Prince, J. (2016). Determinants of Private Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase in Response to the Partnership Program. Health Services Research, 51(2), 687-703.
• Lin, H. (2015). Quality Choice and Market Structure: A Dynamic Analysis of Nursing Home Oligopolies. International Economic Review, 56(4), 1261-1290.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This paper develops a dynamic model of entry and exit to analyze the quality choice and oligopoly market structure in the nursing home industry. The model contains four key features. First, it endogenizes firms' quality decisions. Second, it incorporates private information to capture idiosyncratic sources of profitability. Third, it allows for different cost structures and flexible competition patterns between low- and high-quality firms. Finally, the model employs a two-stage fixed effects approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity across markets. This model is estimated using a hybrid two-step estimator. I find significant heterogeneity in the competitive effects across market structures: firms of similar quality levels compete more strongly than dissimilar firms. Sunk entry costs are extremely large, and quality adjustment behavior is governed by significant fixed adjustment costs. Based on the model estimation, I have done three counterfactuals. The simulation predicts that the overall quality of care deteriorates given an increase in the elderly population. The proposal to eliminate low-quality nursing homes has caused a large supply-side shortage, and lowering entry costs has offered a perverse incentive to provide low quality of care as competition narrows the gap in pay rates between private-pay and Medicaid patients.

• Lin, H., and Wang, Y. (2015). Competition and Price Discrimination in the Parking Garage Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics, 63(3), 522-548.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This paper provides an empirical examination of the relationship between competition and price discrimination in the parking garage industry. We find the degree of price schedule curvature decreases with competition, implying a greater proportional drop in low-end prices than in high-end prices. We explain this result by differences in searching behaviors between short-term and long-term customers.

• Freedman, S., Lin, H., and Simon, K. (2015). Public health insurance expansions and hospital technology adoption. Journal of Public Economics, 121, 117-131.
• Hylton, K., Lin, H., and Chu, H.-Y. (2015). Negligence and Two-Sided Causation. European Journal of Law and Economics, 40(3), 393-411.
• Lin, H. (2014). Revisiting the Relationship between Nurse Staffing and Quality of Care in Nursing Homes: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Health Economics, 37, 13–24.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This paper revisits the relationship between nurse staffing and quality of care in nursing homes using an instrumental variables approach. Most prior studies rely on cross-sectional evidence, which renders causal inference problematic and policy recommendations inappropriate. We exploit legislation changes regarding minimum staffing requirements in eight states between 2000 and 2001 as exogenous shocks to nurse staffing levels. We find that registered nurse staffing has a large and significant impact on quality of care, and that there is no evidence of a significant association between nurse aide staffing and quality of care. A comparison of the IV estimation to the OLS estimation of the first-difference model suggests that ignoring endogeneity would lead to an underestimation of how nurse staffing affects quality of care in nursing homes.

• Lin, H., and Hylton, K. (2014). Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 10(1), 1-25

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This paper modifies the optimal penalty analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid as a general rule. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme. 

• Lin, H., and Hylton, K. (2013). Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care. International Review of Law and Economics, 35, 80-89.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  We present a new model of negligence and causation and examine the influence of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, on the level of care. In this model, the injurer’s decision to take care reduces the likelihood of an accident only in the event that some nondeterministic intervention occurs. The effects of the negligence test depend on the information available to the court, and the manner in which the test is implemented. The key effect of the negligence test, in the presence of intervening causation, is to induce actors to take into account the distribution of the intervention probability as well as its expected value. In the most plausible scenario – where courts have limited information – the test generally leads to socially excessive care.

• Lin, H., and Prince, J. (2013). The Impact of the Partnership Long-Term Care Insurance Program on Private Coverage and Medicaid Expenditures. Journal of Health Economics, 32(6), 1205-1213.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  We examine the impact of U.S. states’ adoption of the partnership long-term care (LTC) insurance program on households’ purchases of private coverage. This program increases benefits of privately insuring via a higher asset threshold for Medicaid eligibility for LTC coverage, and targets middle-class households. We find the program generates few new purchases of LTC insurance, and those it generates are almost entirely by wealthy individuals, as predicted by Medicaid crowd-out. Further analysis suggests that awareness levels of the program, and possibly bequest intentions, also effectively predict response rates, but Medicaid crowd-out persists. We provide an estimate of expected Medicaid savings/costs.

• Lin, H., Ketcham, J. D., Rosenquist, J. N., and Simon, K. (2013). Financial Distress and Use Of Mental Health Care: Evidence from Antidepressant Prescription Claims. Economics Letters, 121(3), 449-453.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Using nationwide county-level longitudinal data, we show that recent declines in housing prices are associated with an increased utilization of antidepressant prescriptions among the near elderly. Our results persist in difference-in-difference models using either all non-antidepressant drugs or statins as controls.

• Lin, H., and Hylton, K. (2010). Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions. Antitrust Law Journal, 77(1), 247-276.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  The recent financial crisis and recession provide an opportunity to reexamine the dynamic versus static efficiency tradeoff in antitrust enforcement policy. We examine implications of the optimal antitrust enforcement model when dynamic efficiency is incorporated. The “dynamic enforcement model” examined here provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, some suggestions for modifying enforcement in light of its dynamic costs, and implies antitrust enforcers should put a greater weight on dynamic efficiency during recessions. 

Edited on July 2, 2024