- Phd, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Business School, 2000
- Goldman, E., Martel, J., and Schneemeier, J. (2021). A Theory of Financial Media. Journal of Financial Economics, in press.
- Goldman, E., Wang, W. (2021). Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders. Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 661–699.
- Borisov, A., Goldman, E., and Gupta, N. (2016). The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying. Review of Financial Studies, 29(4), 1039-107. Winner, Best Paper in the Finance Series, 2015 Standard Life Investments Finance Working Paper prize, European Corporate Governance Institute. Covered in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
- Goldman, E., and Huang, P. (2015). Contractual Versus Actual Separation Pay following CEO Turnover. Management Science, 61(5), 1108-1120.
- Goldman, E., and Strobl, G. (2013). Large Shareholder Trading and the Complexity of Corporate Investments. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(1), 106-122.
- Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., and So, J. (2013). Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts. Review of Finance, 13(5), 1617-1648.
- Goldman, E., Peyer, U., and Stefanescu, I. (2012). The Impact of Fraudulent Earnings Manipulation on Industry Rivals. Financial Management Journal, 41(4), 915-945.
- Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., and So, J. (2009). Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.
- Goldman, E., and Slezak, S. (2006). An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 603-626.
- Goldman, E., and Jun, Q. (2005). Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 321-346.
- Goldman, E. (2005). Organizational Form, Information Collection, and the Value of the Firm. Journal of Business, 78(3), 817-840.
Edited on August 24, 2021