Areas of Expertise

Capital Markets, Voluntary Disclosure, Non-GAAP Reporting, Executive Compensation

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., Business Administration, University of Georgia, 2023
• Master of Accounting, Utah State University, 2018
• BS, Accounting, Utah State University, 2018

Selected Publications

• Cadman, B. D., Campbell, J. L., and Johnson, R. G. (2024). Time Series Variation in the Efficacy of Executive Risk-Taking Incentives: The Role of Market-Wide Uncertainty. The Accounting Review, 99(2), 113-141.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Boards of directors encourage risk-averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk-taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds when market-wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds during high market-wide uncertainty and negative market-wide performance. Finally, we find that compensation committees respond to variation in uncertainty by adjusting the level of option grants. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of incentives to take risk varies with the market-wide uncertainty, and that boards consider this in annual compensation design.

Edited on August 1, 2024