Areas of Expertise

Contracting, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, Fintech

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., Washington University in Saint Louis, 2005

Selected Publications

• Cai, Y., Xu, J., and Yang, J. (2021). Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors. Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 618-660.
• Liao, L., Wang, Z., Xiang, J., Yan, H., and Yang, J. (2021). User Interface and First-hand Experience in Retail Investing. Review of Financial Studies 34(9), 4486-4523.
• Stefanescu, I., Wang, Y., Xie, K., and Yang, J. (2018). Pay Me Now (and Later): Pension Benefit Manipulation before Plan Freezes and Executive Retirement. Journal of Financial Economics, 127(1), 152-173.
• Beneish, M. D., Marshall, C., and Yang, J. (2017). Explaining CEO Retention in Misreporting Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 123(3), 512–535.
• Xu, J., and Yang, J. (2016). Golden Hellos: Signing Bonuses for New Top Executives. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(1), 175-195.
• Faulkender, M., and Yang, J. (2013). Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking. Review of Financial Studies, 26(3), 806-839.
• Baranchuk, N., MacDonald, G., and Yang, J. (2011). The Economics of Super Managers. Review of Financial Studies, 24(10), 3321-3368.
• Yang, J. (2010). Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model. Management Science, 56(9), 1568-1583.
• Faulkender, M., and Yang, J. (2010). Inside the Black Box: The Role and Composition of Compensation Peer Groups. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 257-270.
• Baranchuk, N., Dybvig, P., and Yang, J. (2010). Renegotiation-Proof Contracting, Disclosure, and Incentives for Efficient Investment. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(5), 1805-1836.

Edited on September 9, 2022