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WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:00.660 2 00:00:00.660 --> 00:00:01.660 TOMASZ OBLOJ: All right. 3 00:00:01.660 --> 00:00:03.680 So I think that research interests are probably 4 00:00:03.680 --> 00:00:05.780 best described with examples. 5 00:00:05.780 --> 00:00:08.760 So let me just give you quick examples of the three most 6 00:00:08.760 --> 00:00:11.920 recent projects that I've been working on that ended up being 7 00:00:11.920 --> 00:00:14.200 published in academic journals. 8 00:00:14.200 --> 00:00:18.000 So the first project was actually a multi-paper project 9 00:00:18.000 --> 00:00:22.000 that looked at the consequences of pay transparency. 10 00:00:22.000 --> 00:00:24.060 And along with a team of co-authors, 11 00:00:24.060 --> 00:00:25.960 we looked at different consequences 12 00:00:25.960 --> 00:00:27.720 of pay transparency. 13 00:00:27.720 --> 00:00:30.340 The first one was gender pay equity, 14 00:00:30.340 --> 00:00:32.800 and the second one was productivity. 15 00:00:32.800 --> 00:00:35.020 And looking at the effects of pay transparency, 16 00:00:35.020 --> 00:00:38.020 we actually uncovered a bunch of really interesting mechanisms, 17 00:00:38.020 --> 00:00:39.140 at least I think so. 18 00:00:39.140 --> 00:00:42.560 So first, pay transparency in organizations 19 00:00:42.560 --> 00:00:47.220 leads to decreased inequity in wages. 20 00:00:47.220 --> 00:00:48.360 So this is great. 21 00:00:48.360 --> 00:00:50.700 Now, the side effect of wage transparency, 22 00:00:50.700 --> 00:00:55.180 however, was that the power of incentives was also muted. 23 00:00:55.180 --> 00:00:58.300 So people were paid more equitably, 24 00:00:58.300 --> 00:01:00.680 but they were also paid more similarly 25 00:01:00.680 --> 00:01:04.480 even across different performance levels. 26 00:01:04.480 --> 00:01:06.350 Then we kind of dived a little bit deeper 27 00:01:06.350 --> 00:01:10.870 and we started looking at productivity consequences of pay 28 00:01:10.870 --> 00:01:11.890 transparency. 29 00:01:11.890 --> 00:01:14.430 And what we discovered is that people 30 00:01:14.430 --> 00:01:17.270 who discovered through pay transparency 31 00:01:17.270 --> 00:01:20.630 that they were overpaid, inequitably overpaid, 32 00:01:20.630 --> 00:01:23.510 started putting in more effort, potentially 33 00:01:23.510 --> 00:01:26.750 to justify their high wages to their peers. 34 00:01:26.750 --> 00:01:28.750 On the flip side, people who discovered 35 00:01:28.750 --> 00:01:31.430 they're inequitably underpaid started 36 00:01:31.430 --> 00:01:36.490 putting in less effort to align their inputs with the rewards. 37 00:01:36.490 --> 00:01:39.550 Overall, we found a slightly positive effect 38 00:01:39.550 --> 00:01:41.690 of pay transparency on productivity, 39 00:01:41.690 --> 00:01:43.670 but what we pretty much were interested in 40 00:01:43.670 --> 00:01:47.910 was uncovering or unmasking this heterogeneous responses. 41 00:01:47.910 --> 00:01:48.410 All right. 42 00:01:48.410 --> 00:01:50.210 So this was the first research project. 43 00:01:50.210 --> 00:01:53.890 The second research project, which may seem very dissimilar, 44 00:01:53.890 --> 00:01:55.930 is actually similar on some dimensions, 45 00:01:55.930 --> 00:01:58.710 and I'll come to that in a second. 46 00:01:58.710 --> 00:02:02.430 So there's a notion that firm-specific human capital 47 00:02:02.430 --> 00:02:04.490 is very beneficial to organizations. 48 00:02:04.490 --> 00:02:06.350 So this is the type of human capital 49 00:02:06.350 --> 00:02:10.470 that is most productive when used in the focal organization 50 00:02:10.470 --> 00:02:13.990 and less productive when applied in competitors 51 00:02:13.990 --> 00:02:16.170 or in other organizations. 52 00:02:16.170 --> 00:02:18.830 So firms want their employees to have a lot 53 00:02:18.830 --> 00:02:20.990 of firm-specific human capital. 54 00:02:20.990 --> 00:02:24.250 A, because that makes those employees more productive, 55 00:02:24.250 --> 00:02:26.230 but also because these employees are 56 00:02:26.230 --> 00:02:28.270 less likely to leave because they have 57 00:02:28.270 --> 00:02:31.430 a bunch of human capital that's most valuable 58 00:02:31.430 --> 00:02:33.830 within the organization. 59 00:02:33.830 --> 00:02:36.230 So again, looking at a very detailed data 60 00:02:36.230 --> 00:02:39.750 in the retail banking setting, what I looked at 61 00:02:39.750 --> 00:02:41.830 and what I focused on was the dark side 62 00:02:41.830 --> 00:02:43.830 of firm-specific human capital. 63 00:02:43.830 --> 00:02:46.110 And I uncovered that those employees that 64 00:02:46.110 --> 00:02:48.510 are most productive through their firm-specific human 65 00:02:48.510 --> 00:02:52.990 capital, they are also best at extracting value 66 00:02:52.990 --> 00:02:54.352 through incentive gaming. 67 00:02:54.352 --> 00:02:56.310 So there is some balance, and this is something 68 00:02:56.310 --> 00:02:58.150 that I really like in research. 69 00:02:58.150 --> 00:03:00.850 Now, what links together these two projects, 70 00:03:00.850 --> 00:03:05.750 even though they may seem very distant is that, 71 00:03:05.750 --> 00:03:07.830 and this is what I study in my research overall, 72 00:03:07.830 --> 00:03:09.990 is that I link organizational design 73 00:03:09.990 --> 00:03:13.030 choices, behavioral micro-level mechanisms 74 00:03:13.030 --> 00:03:14.700 at the individual level, and then 75 00:03:14.700 --> 00:03:16.880 a range of outcomes for organizations. 76 00:03:16.880 --> 00:03:19.200 And those outcomes can be financial performance. 77 00:03:19.200 --> 00:03:22.500 They can be societal performance, so different 78 00:03:22.500 --> 00:03:23.940 objective function. 79 00:03:23.940 --> 00:03:25.860 They can be mobility. 80 00:03:25.860 --> 00:03:27.740 They can be competitive outcomes, so 81 00:03:27.740 --> 00:03:28.660 a range of outcomes. 82 00:03:28.660 --> 00:03:31.840 I'm really fairly agnostic to which outcome I study. 83 00:03:31.840 --> 00:03:35.420 I'm much more interested in the micro-level mechanisms 84 00:03:35.420 --> 00:03:37.820 that lead organizations to perform better 85 00:03:37.820 --> 00:03:40.580 or worse on some dimension. 86 00:03:40.580 --> 00:03:44.180 So if I'm going to be working with EDBA students, 87 00:03:44.180 --> 00:03:46.560 I would like them to get their hands dirty. 88 00:03:46.560 --> 00:03:49.420 I would like to get their hands dirty with data, 89 00:03:49.420 --> 00:03:54.160 with actual organizational decisions, with design choices 90 00:03:54.160 --> 00:03:58.340 under an overarching umbrella of linking organization design 91 00:03:58.340 --> 00:04:00.640 choices-- this could be transparency, 92 00:04:00.640 --> 00:04:04.160 it could be incentive systems, it could be ownership structure, 93 00:04:04.160 --> 00:04:06.140 it could be the level of autonomy, 94 00:04:06.140 --> 00:04:08.800 any design, structural design choice, 95 00:04:08.800 --> 00:04:11.700 and linking that to a range of objectives 96 00:04:11.700 --> 00:04:12.760 that firms may pursue. 97 00:04:12.760 --> 00:04:14.680 Some firms pursue multiple objectives. 98 00:04:14.680 --> 00:04:18.260 Some firms pursue only one objective, though very few, 99 00:04:18.260 --> 00:04:21.700 but really trying to understand those linkages. 100 00:04:21.700 --> 00:04:25.580 I work with a range of methods, from lab experiments 101 00:04:25.580 --> 00:04:28.300 to field experiments, A/B testing, 102 00:04:28.300 --> 00:04:31.900 analyzing large archival data, but also 103 00:04:31.900 --> 00:04:34.540 looking at surveys or questionnaires 104 00:04:34.540 --> 00:04:36.220 within an organization. 105 00:04:36.220 --> 00:04:39.340 I would love to work with EDBA students 106 00:04:39.340 --> 00:04:42.140 on data from the organizations, if they're 107 00:04:42.140 --> 00:04:45.320 able to get this data in which they currently work. 108 00:04:45.320 --> 00:04:49.780 But I'm also very happy to share different data sets that I have, 109 00:04:49.780 --> 00:04:54.700 or we can collectively collect publicly available data 110 00:04:54.700 --> 00:04:58.220 to study these relationships in depth. 111 00:04:58.220 --> 00:05:04.340 Again, all around three somewhat interconnected elements, 112 00:05:04.340 --> 00:05:07.760 individual level, micro processes. 113 00:05:07.760 --> 00:05:09.620 It could be cognitive biases, could be 114 00:05:09.620 --> 00:05:12.280 decision-making patterns or structures, 115 00:05:12.280 --> 00:05:14.340 organization design choices. 116 00:05:14.340 --> 00:05:16.360 And then finally, at the most macro level, 117 00:05:16.360 --> 00:05:18.570 organizational outcomes. 118 00:05:18.570 --> 00:05:23.000