Areas of Expertise

Managerial accounting, Misreporting, Performance evaluations and incentives, Experimental economics

Academic Degrees

• Ph.D., University of Arizona, 2019
• M.S. in Accountancy, University of Notre Dame, 2011
• B.S. in Accountancy, Arizona State University, 2010

Professional Experience

• Audit Senior, Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2013 – 2014
• Audit Associate, Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2011 – 2013
• Certified Public Accountant (CPA), State of Arizona, 2011 – 2022

Selected Publications

• Andrassy, J., Brown, J., Mallon, T., and Sauciuc, A. K. (2027). Productivity versus efficiency: The effect of incentive focus on target setting in participative budgets. The Accounting Review, in press.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Firms typically design incentive systems to motivate employees and advance firm objectives, including productivity (i.e., maximizing output) and efficiency (i.e., minimizing input). However, there remains little empirical research on the potential psychological effects of adopting a productivity versus efficiency focus on employee risk perceptions and decision-making. To address this important gap, we examine how these different incentive foci affect employee target setting under participative budgets. We predict and find that employees perceive efficiency incentives as riskier than productivity incentives, leading to lower target setting. Moreover, consistent with our theory, this effect disappears in the absence of outcome uncertainty. We also find employees are less likely to achieve their target and have higher error rates under efficiency incentives, despite setting easier targets. Overall, our findings suggest that efficiency incentives, relative to productivity incentives, can have detrimental effects on target setting and subsequent performance in participative budgeting settings.

• Douthit, J. D., Hewitt, M. R., and Sauciuc, A. K. (2026). Improving coordination in teams: Combining team and individual relative performance evaluations. Management Science, in press. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.01870

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Employees working in teams often fail to coordinate because of strategic uncertainty, i.e., difficulty predicting their colleagues’ actions. Using an incentivized economic experiment, we examine the potentially beneficial effects of a ubiquitous competitive incentive—individual relative performance evaluations (RPE)—in reducing strategic uncertainty and improving team output. When employees work in highly interdependent teams and are motivated by team incentives, we predict that individual RPE reduce employees’ strategic uncertainty and, in doing so, improve coordination. Consistent with our theory, we find that the use of individual RPE reduces employees’ strategic uncertainty about both their team members’ direct effort and indirect actions (i.e., helping or hurting). Furthermore, by reducing each component of strategic uncertainty, we find that firms can effectively improve coordination and team output. Contrary to claims that competitive, individual-level incentives harm team outcomes, our study highlights that individual RPE play an important role in reducing strategic uncertainty such that their use in interdependent teams motivated by cooperative team incentives yields superior outcomes.

• Douthit, J., and Sauciuc, A. (2026). The effect of unstable budget difficulty on performance over time. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 116, 101639. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2026.101639

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Firms generally seek to set budget targets with similar levels of expected difficulty each period. However, variability in realized budget difficulty across periods can occur, resulting in unstable budget difficulty. Although variability in budget difficulty arguably reduces the value of preset fixed budget targets for performance evaluation, we develop theory that predicts unstable (relative to stable) budget difficulty will increase employee performance over time. Specifically, we predict that unstable budget difficulty incentivizes greater attempts at ability improvement to prepare for future periods of potentially higher difficulty. Our experimental results support this theory. We also find evidence that suggests the ability improvement from unstable settings is greater for moderate, relative to low, typical difficulty levels. These results significantly improve our understanding of the effect of fixed budgets when budget difficulty is likely unstable.

• Holzman, E. R., Miller, B. P., Rennekamp, K. M. and Sauciuc, A. K. (2026). The Role of Observed Punishment in Deterring the Spillover Effects of Corporate Misconduct Among Non-Peers. Journal of Accounting Research, 64(1), 279-316. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.70002

  Abstract

  Abstract

  This study investigates (1) whether misreporting by corporate executives impacts unethical decision-making by non-peers in unrelated reporting tasks, and (2) whether observing various forms of punishment for corporate misreporting deters this spillover effect. Specifically, we examine the deterrent effects of two common forms of punishment (fines or imprisonment) and a novel form of punishment (public shaming). Across two experiments, we find that participants are more likely to misreport performance when exposed to media reports about executives engaging in financial misreporting. This evidence is consistent with executive misreporting leading to unethical decision-making among non-peer observers. We also find that participant misreporting is reduced when the media reports the punishments levied against those executives. In further mediation tests, our findings suggest observed punishments for corporate misconduct can influence perceptions of injunctive norms and potentially mitigate spillover in unethical behavior.

• Sauciuc, A. (2025). The effects of performance-based incentive frequency on collusion. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 114, 101591.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  A common set of problematic conditions exist across many of the most egregious cases of collusion in recent decades (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Wells Fargo), including weak internal control systems, intense pressure to reach nearly impossible targets, and social pressure that encourages employees to trade their own morals to conform with group norms. I capture this core set of conditions in a carefully designed laboratory experiment to examine whether and how an important element of compensation contracting—incentive frequency—may foster adverse norms. Specifically, I predict and find that incentive frequency influences how individuals rationalize collusion, thereby affecting the reporting norms that develop within groups. Groups with relatively infrequent incentives oscillate between collusion and truthful reporting, consistent with moral licensing behavior; whereas frequent incentives produce a spillover effect whereby collusion persists, consistent with ethical erosion. These results have important implications for compensation design and the use of management control systems.

• Lowe, D. J., Reckers, P. M., and Sauciuc, A. K. (2023). The Influence of Professional Commitment and Rationalization-Discrediting Interventions on Unethical Audit Decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 42(3), 87–106.

  Abstract

  Abstract

  Individuals often engage in a rationalization process to self-justify questionable conduct. However, as “gatekeepers” to the market, it is vitally important for professional auditors to avoid such practices. Recognizing that some individuals may be more prone to rationalize than others, we first identify an important subset of professional auditors that we expect is more susceptible to rationalizing unethical behavior: those with low professional commitment. We then examine whether rationalization-discrediting interventions can mitigate such behavior among this auditor subset. Specifically, we developed interventions geared toward discrediting some of the most commonly used rationalizations found in practice in order to promote a more ethical mindset and reduce unethical behavior. Using professional auditor participants, our results confirm that auditors with low (high) professional commitment are more (less) likely to accede to unethical requests from superiors. Further, among those with low professional commitment, our rationalization-discrediting interventions were effective in reducing unethical intentions.

Edited on September 14, 2026