The Design of Contracts, Institutions, and Markets
August 22-25, 1991
Friday, August 23
- Session I, Contract Design and Managerial Behavior: 8:30 a.m.- 12:30 p.m.
- Managerial Bargaining Power in the Determination of Compensation Contracts and Corporate Investment
- Neal Stoughton, UC-Irvine
- Eli Talmor, UC-Irvine and Tel Aviv University
- Mark Bagnoli, Indiana University
- Resolution Preference and Project Choice
- David Hirshleifer, UCLA
- Tarun Chordia, UCLA
- Robert Heinkel, UBC
- Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts
- Franklin Allen, Wharton
- Douglas Gale, Pittsburgh
- Patricia Wilson, Indiana University
- 12:30-2:15 p.m.
Lunch at the Tudor Room, Indiana Memorial Union
- Session II, Debt Contracts and Renegotiation: 2:15-4:45 p.m.
- Sovereign Debt: Optimal Contract, Underinvestment and Forgiveness
- Eduardo Schwartz, UCLA
- Salvador Zurita, UCLA
- Lemma Senbet, University of Maryland
- Debt Covenants and Renegotiation
- Mitchell Berlin, NYU
- Loretta Mester, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
- Chris James, University of Florida
- 5:30 p.m.
Dinner at Siam House
Saturday, August 24
- Session III, Design of the Corporation, Ownership Structure, and Related Issues: 8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
- Limitation of Liability and Corporate Form
- Andrew Winton, Wharton
- Sreenivas Kamma, Indiana University
- Contributing Shares
- Michael Brennan, UCLA and London Business School
- Ian Dunlop, University of Western Australia
- Wayne Lee, Kent State University
- 12:30-2:15 p.m.
Lunch at Hunan House
- Session IV, Market Design, Trading, and Related Issues: 2:15-4:45 p.m.
- Asymmetric Information, The Third Market and Investor Welfare
- Lawrence Glosten, Columbia
- Craig Holden, Indiana University
- Mandatory Disclosure of Trades and Market Liquidity
- Michael Fishman, Northwestern
- Kathleen Hagerty, Northwestern
- David Brown, Indiana University
Sunday, August 25
- Session V, Design of Institutions, Financial Intermediation, and Regulation: 8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
- Optimal Contingent Bank Liquidation Under Moral Hazard
- Charles Calmiris, Northwestern
- Charles Kahn, Illinois
- Stephen Krasa, Illinois
- Arnoud Boot, Northwestern
- An Incentive-Based Theory of Bank Regulation
- Tim Campbell, USC
- Yuk-Shee Chan, USC
- Anthony Marino, USC
- Stuart Greenbaum, Northwestern
- Venture Capital Contracting in a Dynamic Context
- Anat Admati, Stanford
- Paul Pfleiderer, Stanford
- Motty Perry, Hebrew University
- Dan Siegel, University of Washington