Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators
1994, Public Choice
Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.
Rasmusen, Eric Bennett and J. Mark Ramseyer (1994), "Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Vol. 78, 305-327. Reprinted in Gianluca Fiorentini and Stefano Zamagni (eds.), The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, Edward Elgar.