Recruitment into Managed Courts during Political Chaos: Japan in the 1990s
2007, Journal of Comparative Economics
J. Mark Ramseyer, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Because of the risk of political interference, in countries with managed courts disproportionately jurists who share ruling-party preferences self-select into judicial careers. During political turmoil, such jurists will find judicial careers less attractive. Although their more heterodox peers might otherwise take such careers in their stead, incumbents (appointed by the formerly dominant party) may exclude them. With the orthodox jurists shunning the courts and the heterodox blocked, recruitment will lag. Combining data on a random sample of 1300 Japanese lawyers and all 2100 judges hired between 1971 and 1998, we locate evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In MS Word and pdf ( http://www.rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen-07-JCE.90sjudges.pdf).
Rasmusen, Eric Bennett and J. Mark Ramseyer (2007), "Recruitment into Managed Courts during Political Chaos: Japan in the 1990s," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2, June, 329-345.