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Indiana University Bloomington

BEPP

The Kelley Advantage

The department is home to the authors of Managerial Economics and Business Strategy and Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, two of the nation’s leading textbooks in the field.

Research and Publications

Journal Articles

“Comparing Formal and Informal Lobbying Practices in China: The Capital’s Ambivalent Embrace of Capitalists,

2009, China Information

Scott Kennedy

Abstract

The marketization of China's economy and the attendant need for a supporting regulatory framework have resulted in extensive lobbying by Chinese and foreign industry. The central party-state has adopted an ambivalent posture toward this development. On the one hand, the government has encouraged the development of industry associations, public hearings, and comment-and-response periods for draft laws and regulations to routinize public policy consultations. On the other hand, the central party-state is deeply concerned about the political consequences of permitting greater social activism, and hence, it continues to constrain the maturation of these same formal institutions and processes. As a consequence, informal lobbying practices, such as direct lobbying and manipulation of the media, have become more prominent vehicles for industry involvement in the policy process.

Citation

Kennedy, Scott (2009), “Comparing Formal and Informal Lobbying Practices in China: The Capital’s Ambivalent Embrace of Capitalists,” China Information, Vol. 23, No. 2 July, pp. 195-222.