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Indiana University Bloomington

BEPP

The Kelley Advantage

The department is home to the authors of Managerial Economics and Business Strategy and Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, two of the nation’s leading textbooks in the field.

Research and Publications

Journal Articles

The Design of Fiscal Rules and Forms of Governance in European Union Countries

2007, European Journal of Political Economy

Jürgen von Hagen, Mark Hallerberg, Rolf R. Strauch

Abstract

This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries, and their impact of public finances since the mid-1980s. It presents a new data set on institutional reforms and their impact in Europe. Empirical pattern confirm our prediction that more stringent fiscal rules exist under large coalition governments, while the centralisation of budgetary procedures is the main form of fiscal governance elsewhere. In addition, the centralisation of procedures does not restrain public debt in countries more prone to a rules-based approach, whereas more stringent fiscal rules seem to support fiscal discipline in almost all EU countries.

Citation

von Hagen, Jürgen, Mark Hallerberg, and Rolf R. Strauch (2007), "The Design of Fiscal Rules and Forms of Governance in European Union Countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 338-359.

Keywords

public indebtedness, budgetary procedures, fiscal rules, European public finances