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Indiana University Bloomington

BEPP

The Kelley Advantage

The department is home to the authors of Managerial Economics and Business Strategy and Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, two of the nation’s leading textbooks in the field.

Research and Publications

Journal Articles

Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators

1994, Public Choice

Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer

Abstract

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.

Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett and J. Mark Ramseyer (1994), "Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Vol. 78, 305-327. Reprinted in Gianluca Fiorentini and Stefano Zamagni (eds.), The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, Edward Elgar.